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Abstract
In economically developed countries, aging of the population with fewer children is pro-
gressing. Social security benefits such as pensions and elderly care are increasing. In a society
with fewer children, it is difficult for a government to provide sufficient pension benefits for
older people if pay-as-you-go pensions are adopted because a decrease in the working popu-
lation reduces tax revenues to provide pension benefits. Therefore, the pension contribution
rate must be increased to provide sufficient pension benefits. This paper demonstrates that
an increase in the pension contribution rate can not always raise pension benefits. However,
if a government provides a subsidy for elderly care services and if aggregate demand for
elderly care services increases, then the pension benefit can always increase because younger
people purchase elderly care services and increase the labor supply instead of performing
elderly care with their time. Moreover, this paper presents an examination of whether a
subsidy for elderly care can raise the level of social welfare or not and shows that the subsidy
can raise the social welfare level thanks to an increase in pension benefits.
Keywords: Aging society, Elderly care service, Pay-as-you-go pension
JEL Classifications: H51, H55, J14
∗This paper was presented at the 2013 Spring Meeting of Japan Association for Applied Economics and the
seminar held at Kwansei Gakuin University and Kyoto Sangyo University. I would like to thank Nobuo Akai,
Masamichi Kawano, Minoru Kunizaki, Kazunobu Muro and seminar participants for very helpful comments. The
research for this paper was financially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (No. 23730283). Any
errors are the author’s responsibility.
†Correspondence to: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, 1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho, Nishi-
nomiya, Hyogo 662-8501, Japan. Tel.: +81-798-54-6993, E-mail: yasuoka@kwansei.ac.jp
1 Introduction
Japan’s aging society is progressing. Older people who need elderly care services will increase.
Colombo et al. (2011) surveys a recent OECD study of long-term care. Average public spending
on long-term care was 1.5% of GDP in 2008. This public spending increases in an aging society.
The ratio of the workforce in the elderly care service to total workforce was 1.3% at 2008. Cremer
and Pestieau (2012) explain that elderly care service will necessarily increase in OECD countries.
In France and Germany, which provide sufficient elderly care services in the market, informal
care given by the family will not increase greatly.1 However, in Italy and Poland, informal care
given by the family is expected to increase greatly. Informal care provided by the family brings
about negative effects on the labor supply. Younger people care for elderly parents with their
time. Therefore, younger people must cut their working time, which engenders a decrease in the
aggregate labor supply. In OECD countries, especially in Japan, fertility is low. The working
generations might decrease in the future. This fact presents a problem because the decrease in
labor supply reduces the tax revenue. Consequently, the government can not provide sufficient
social security benefits.
The study of long-term care can be examined from many perspectives. Many studies have
been conducted to assess the insurance of long-term care. Pauly (1990) reports that public
long-term care insurance is necessary because of adverse selection. Miyazawa, Moudoukoutas
and Yagi (2000) also consider public long-term care insurance. Cremer and Pestieau (2011) and
Cremer and Roeder (2012) report that the subsidy for private long-term care insurance or the
public provision of long-term care is needed. However, Richter and Ritzberger (1995) show that
the public long-term care insurance brings about moral hazard: people do not make an effort to
avoid needing elderly care service. The risk of elderly care service brings about precautionary
saving, which reduces the utility, compared with the perfect foresight economy. Although long-
term care has negative effects such as moral hazard, insurance has a positive effect on utility, as
shown by Smith and Witter (2004).
Some studies have examined how the insurance of long-term care affects economic growth, in-
1Data from EC (2009).
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come per capita, and welfare. Tabata (2005) shows that the subsidy for long-term care increases
the utility level in present generations instead of decreasing the future generation’s utility for
preventing economic growth. Mizushima (2009) derives the optimal subsidy level of long-term
care. Miyazawa (2010) considers elderly care as a provision in kind and shows that is better than
a provision in cash in terms of welfare and economic growth. In OECD countries, long-term
care expenditure and the workforce related to elderly care services increase in an aging society.
This situation in OECD countries is explained by Hashimoto and Tabata (2010).
Moreover, some studies examine how the subsidy for elderly care service affects the formal
care purchased in the market and the informal care given by the family. Korn and Wrede (2012)
examine how the long-term care service provided in the market affects the female labor supply.
However, they do not consider the subsidy for elderly care service. Mou and Winer (2012)
considers the subsidy for the formal care purchased by the parents that long-term care is given
and examines how this subsidy affects the formal care and informal care given by their children.
This paper presents an examination of whether the subsidy for elderly care service can
raise the labor supply and then increase the pension benefit or not. In an aging society, it is
difficult to provide a certain level of pension benefits because of a lack of revenue caused by a
decrease in the number of younger people. However, even if younger people become fewer, the
government can gain revenue by virtue of an increase in labor supply. Therefore, if the subsidy for
elderly care services promotes the purchase of formal care in the market and reduces informal
care time, this subsidy raises the labor supply and the revenue to provide pension benefits.
This paper presents derivation of these results. As described herein, even if the government
increases the contribution rate to increase pension benefits, the pension benefits can not always
increase. However, a subsidy for elderly care can always increase pension benefits. Therefore,
both pensions and the subsidy for elderly care services should be provided simultaneously.
The government set child-care support policies to raise fertility, supporting the working
population of the future. Child-care policies are intended to raise the working population to
provide sufficient social security benefits for future generations. However, this paper shows that
an increase in pension benefits will occur even if the government does not provide child-care
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support policies.
This paper consists of the following sections. Section 2 sets the model and Section 3 derives
the equilibrium in the model economy. Section 4 examines how the subsidy affects the labor
supply and that pension benefits can rise by virtue of this subsidy. Section 5 evaluates the
policy effects in terms of social welfare. The final section presents results obtained through the
analyses presented in this paper.
2 The Model
The model economy presented herein is constructed in terms of a two-period (young and old)
overlapping generations model. The economy comprises agents of three types: households,
firm of two types (one produces elderly care services; the other produces final goods), and a
government. In t period, the population of younger people is Nt and the population of older
people is Nt−1. Then, the gross population growth rate is given as n = NtNt−1 , which represents
an intergenerational population ratio. The population growth rate is assumed to be constant
over time. We explain the agents in the following subsections.
2.1 Households
Individuals in households exist in two periods: a young period and old period. Younger people
provide labor supply to gain labor income. The labor income is allocated to consumption in a
younger period and savings to consume in the old period. In addition, younger people provide
elderly care. There are two means to provide elderly care. One is time. Younger people have a
unit of time. This paper assumes that φ unit of time is necessary to provide a unit of elderly
care. The other is to buy elderly care provided by an elderly care service market. Then, it is
assumed that younger people pay a price pt for a unit of the service if they want to use the
service. Then, a household’s lifetime budget constraint is shown as presented below.
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= (1− τ)awt(1− φet)− T + St+11 + rt+1 ,Not Using Care Service (1)
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
+ (1− )ptet = (1− τ)awt − T + St+11 + rt+1 ,Using Care Service (2)
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Therein, c1t and c2t+1 respectively denote the consumption of young people in t period and in
the old period in t + 1 period. The younger people provide elderly care et for their parents. A
φ unit of time is needed if they provide elderly care with their time. Then, the labor supply
is 1 − φet. However, if the younger people purchase elderly care services at price pt, then the
younger people can provide a unit of time as the labor supply. wt and 1 + rt denote the wage
rate per an effective labor unit and the interest rate. This paper assumes that the households
have productivity a, which is uniformly distributed between a and a¯ (a¯ > a). Then, the density
function is given as 1a¯−a . Also, τ denotes the pension contribution rate; St+1 shows pension
benefits in the old period at t+1 period. T denotes the lump-sum taxation to provide a subsidy
for elderly care. This subsidy rate is assumed as  (0 <  < 1).
The household’s utility function is assumed as
u = α ln c1t + β ln c2t + (1− α− β) ln et, 0 < α, 0 < β,α+ β < 1. (3)
The households decide the optimal allocation to maximize their utility (3) subject to their budget
constraint (1) or (2) as
c1t = α
(
(1− τ)awt − T + St+11 + rt+1
)
, (4)
c2t+1 = (1 + rt+1)β
(
(1− τ)awt − T + St+11 + rt+1
)
, (5)
ent =
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)awt − T + St+11+rt+1
)
φ(1− τ)awt , or (6)
ect =
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)awt − T + St+11+rt+1
)
(1− )pt . (7)
Therein, ent denotes the elderly care provided by younger people who do not purchase care
services; ect denotes the elderly care service provided in the market. As long as (1 − )pt <
φ(1 − τ)awt, younger people purchase elderly care service in the market. Unless the younger
people provide elderly care by themselves.
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2.2 Firms
In this model, two sectors exist: one for the final goods sector and the other for the elderly care
sector. The production function in the final goods sector is assumed as
Yt = F (Kt, Lt),
∂Yt
∂Kt
> 0,
∂Yt
∂Lt
> 0,
∂2Yt
∂K2t
< 0,
∂2Yt
∂L2t
< 0,
∂Yt
∂Kt∂Lt
> 0. (8)
In those expressions, Kt and Lt respectively denote capital stock and effective labor. Assuming
a competitive market, the wage rate and the interest rate are shown as
wt = f(kt)− f ′(kt)kt, (9)
1 + rt = f ′(kt), (10)
where YtLt ≡ f ′(kt) and kt ≡ KtLt . This paper assumes full capital depreciation in one period.
Moreover, for these analyses, we assume a small open economy. The wage rate and the interest
rate are given exogenously as w and 1 + r, respectively. An individual has productivity a gain
wage rate aw because w is the wage rate per effective labor unit. In addition to the final goods
sector, the elderly care service sector exists in this model. The production function in elderly
care service is shown as
Y ct = ρL
c
t , ρ > 0. (11)
The elderly care service is produced only by labor input. This function is assumed by Hashimoto
and Tabata (2010) and Yasuoka and Miyake (2010).2 Then, the profit function is shown as
pit = ptρLct − wctLct . (12)
The wage rate wct is given as
wct = ρpt. (13)
This paper defines aˆ as aˆ = (1−)ptφ(1−τ)wt and assumes that if individuals work in the elderly care
service sector, then they receive the labor income wct in spite of their productivity a. Therefore,
individuals that have the ability wct > aw, they work in elderly care service sector. However,
2Hashimoto and Tabata (2010) assume this function form and examine elderly care service market with pop-
ulation aging. Yasuoka and Miyake (2010) assume the same function form as child care service sector.
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given wct < aw, they work in the final goods sector. Therefore, defining a˜ ≡ w
c
t
w , the younger
people who have productivity in [a, a˜] work in the elderly care service market. Younger people
who have productivity in (a˜, a¯] work in the final goods market.3
Considering (13) and a˜, we obtain
pt =
a˜w
ρ
. (14)
Therefore, an increase in a˜, which means an increase in the labor population in elderly care
service market, raises price pt.
The analysis presented in this paper assumes a˜ < aˆ, i.e., 1−ρφ(1−τ) > 1. This assumption is
set for simplicity. Even if this paper were not to set this assumption, the proposition obtained
in this study might not change. The budget constraint (1) and the demand for elderly care (6)
of individuals that work in elderly care service are given as
c1t +
c2t+1
1 + rt+1
= (1− τ)wct (1− φet)− T +
St+1
1 + rt+1
, (15)
ent =
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)wct − T + St+11+rt+1
)
φ(1− τ)wct
. (16)
2.3 Government
The government in this model economy provides a subsidy for elderly care service provided
in the market and pay-as-you-go pension. First, the government levies lump-sum taxation on
younger people to subsidize elderly care services. Consideration of the balanced budget reduces
to the following equation: ∫ a¯
aˆ
pte
c
t
a¯− ada = T. (17)
Substituting (7) into (17), we obtain
1− α− β
a¯− a

1− 
(
(1− τ)(a¯2 − aˆ2)w
2
+
(
−T + St+1
1 + r
)
(a¯− aˆ)
)
= T. (18)
Second, the government provides a pay-as-you-go pension by which the government collects
revenue from younger people at t period and gives the benefit for the older people in same t
3Meckl and Zink (2004) consider productivity a and assume that the individual gain in wage a2w if he works in
skilled labor sector. He gains wage aw if he works in the unskilled labor sector. The elderly care service described
in this paper is similar to that of the unskilled labor sector introduced by Meckl and Zink (2004).
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period. With the balanced budget, the budget constraint is shown as
nτ
(∫ a¯
aˆ
aw
a¯− ada+
∫ aˆ
a˜
(1− φect)aw
a¯− a da+
∫ a˜
a
(1− φect)wct
a¯− a da
)
= St. (19)
3 Equilibrium
The market equilibrium condition in elderly care service market is given as (7) and (11). We
obtain the following equation:
1− α− β
1− 
∫ a¯
aˆ
(
(1− τ)aw − T + St+1
1 + r
)
1
a¯− ada = pt
ρ(a˜− a)
a¯− a . (20)
Therefore, the price of elderly care service pt is reduced by
pt =
1− α− β
ρ(a˜− a)(1− )
(
(1− τ)w(a¯2 − aˆ2)
2
+
(
−T + St+1
1 + r
)
(a¯− aˆ)
)
, (21)
where aˆ = (1−)ptφ(1−τ)w and a˜ =
ρpt
w . Given St+1, the price pt is given to hold this equation. The
dynamics of St is reduced by substituting (19) into (6) and (16) as
nτ
a¯− a
(
w(a¯2 − aˆ2)
2
+
∫ aˆ
a˜
awda−
∫ aˆ
a˜
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)aw − T + St+11+r
)
1− τ da
+
∫ a˜
a
wct − (1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)wct − T + St+11+r
)
1− τ
 da) = St. (22)
Given pt and St+1, we obtain St. Then, considering (21) and (22), we obtain the elderly care
service price pt.
4 Subsidy for Elderly Care Services
This section presents examination of the subsidy for elderly care et. The government gives the
subsidy to younger people to buy elderly care services supplied in the market. Such a subsidy
can stimulate labor supply and raise tax revenue to provide pension benefits. This section
presents an examination of whether the subsidy can raise the pension benefit or not thanks to
an increase in labor supply. First, this paper shows that the subsidy can decrease aˆ, i.e., the
subsidy can increases the younger people that buy elderly care in the market and work in full
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time. Differentiating (7) and (17) by  and T at the approximation at  = 0 and T = 0, we
obtain the following equation,
dT =
1− α− β
a¯− a
(
(1− τ)(a¯2 − aˆ2)
2
+
(a¯− aˆ)S
1 + r
)
d. (23)
Substituting a˜ = ρptw into aˆ =
(1−)pt
φ(1−τ)w and completely differentiating at  = 0, the following
equation is derived as
da˜ = φ(1− τ)ρdaˆ+ a˜d. (24)
Substituting pt =
φ(1−τ)aˆw
1− into (21) and completely differentiating at  = 0 and T = 0, we
obtain (
φ(1− τ)wρ(2a˜− a) + (1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)w + St+1
1 + r
))
daˆ
= −a˜2wd− (a¯− aˆ)(1− α− β)dT. (25)
With (23)–(25), we obtain the negative sign of daˆd < 0 as
daˆ
d
= −
a˜2w + (a¯−aˆ)(1−α−β)
2
a¯−a
(
(1−τ)(a¯2−aˆ2)w
2 +
(a¯−aˆ)S
1+r
)
φwρ(1− τ)(2a˜− a) + (1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)w + S1+r
) < 0. (26)
Then, the following proposition is established.
Proposition 1 The subsidy for the elderly care service in the market can increase the number
of younger people who purchase elderly care services and work full time.
When the number of younger people who buy elderly care services in the market increases,
this subsidy has the effect of an increase in the labor supply. However, this subsidy does not
change the labor supply of individuals who have productivity [0, aˆ]. They provide (1 − φent )
units of time for labor supply. The lump-sum tax T affects ent . As shown by (6) and (16), the
lump-sum tax decreases elderly care time and increases labor time 1− φent . These increases in
labor supply raise the pension benefit St+1. However, this effect increases ent and decreases labor
supply 1− φent . Therefore, they do not always increase their labor supply.
This paper presents an examination of how the government can increase pension benefits. We
consider two means to raise pension benefits. One is an increase in contribution rate. The other
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is the subsidy for elderly care services. First, we examine whether an increase in contribution
rate can pull up pension benefits or not. Now, we consider the pension benefit St = St+1 = S in
the steady state. Differentiating (21) and (22) by τ and S, we obtain the following equation.4
dS
dτ
=
S
τ +
(1−α−β)(aˆ−a)S
(a¯−a)(1−τ)2(1+r) − (1−α−β)aˆ(a¯−a)(1−τ)
(
aˆw + S(1−τ)(1+r)
)
1 + (1−α−β)(aˆ−a)(a¯−a)(1−τ)(1+r)
+
(α+β)(a˜−a)ρ
a¯−a − (1−α−β)aˆ(a¯−a)p
(
aˆw + S(1−τ)(1+r)
)
1 + (1−α−β)(aˆ−a)(a¯−a)(1−τ)(1+r)
dp
dτ
, (27)
where
dp
dτ
=
1−α−β
ρ(a˜−a)
(
a¯−aˆ
1+r
dS
dτ − aˆ1−τ
(
(1− τ)waˆ+ S1+r
)
− w(a¯2−aˆ2)2
)
1 +
a˜+
(1−α−β)aˆ
ρp ((1−τ)waˆ+ S1+r )
a˜−a
.
The sign of dSdτ is ambiguous. The first term of (27) shows the direct effect of an increase
in τ . This effect directly raises the pension benefit S. However, an increase in τ reduces
the opportunity cost for elderly care and the household’s labor supply decreases. This effect
decreases the pension benefit S. The second term of (27) shows the effect of an increase in τ on
elderly care service price p. An increase in τ reduces the demand for care because an increase
in τ reduces the opportunity cost to provide elderly care with their time. Moreover, even if
the younger people purchase elderly care services in the market, the demand for care in the
market decreases because of a decrease in disposable household income. Therefore, tax revenue
to provide pensions decreases because a decrease in pt is the same as a decrease in the wage rate
wc. Considering aˆ = (1−)ptφ(1−τ)w , the younger people who provide elderly care with time increase
because of an increase in τ : an increase in τ reduces the opportunity cost for elderly care and
decreases the younger people who work in full time. Consequently, the labor supply decreases.
Revenue for pension benefits decreases, too. Therefore, an increase in the contribution rate of
pensions can not always raise pension benefits, although an increase in the contribution rate
directly raises the pension benefit.
Next, we examine whether the subsidy for elderly care service in the market can pull up the
pension benefit or not. If the subsidy for elderly care service increases the aggregate demand
for elderly care services, the supply of elderly care service increases, i.e., da˜d > 0.
5 Completely
4The locally stable condition of the steady state is obtained in the Appendix.
5See the Appendix for a detailed proof.
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differentiating (21) and (22) in the steady state by T and S, because daˆd < 0 and
dT
d > 0, we
obtain the following.
dS
d
=
− (1−α−β)S(1+r)(1−τ)w daˆd +
(1−α−β)(aˆ−a) dT
d
+(α+β)(a˜−a) da˜
d
(1−τ)w
(1−α−β)(aˆ−a)
w(1−τ) +
a¯−a
wnτ
> 0 (28)
Then, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the subsidy for elderly care service increases the aggregate demand for elderly
care services, then pension benefits increase by virtue of an increase in labor supply.
This proposition presents an important policy implication. Some economically developed
countries suffer from an aging society with fewer children. If the pension benefit is managed
using a pay-as-you-go pension, then fewer children, which decreases the younger people in fu-
ture, decreases pension benefits in the future. Therefore, the government must increase the
contribution rate of pensions because pension benefits are kept at a certain level.6 However, this
paper presents derivation that an increase in the contribution rate can not always raise pension
benefits. Therefore, the government must consider another way to increase pension benefits.
The subsidy for elderly care can increase then labor supply. Then, by virtue of an increase in
the labor supply, the government can collect revenue to pay for older people as pension benefits.
5 Welfare Analysis
The subsidy for elderly care services can raise the pension benefit S in a steady state. However,
social welfare can not always be raised by a subsidy for elderly care services because of the
greater tax burden. This section presents an examination of whether the subsidy for elderly
care can raise the level of social welfare or not.
This paper defines ui as type i’s utility and the following social welfare function W in the
steady state.
W =
∫ a¯
aˆ
ux
1
a¯− ada+
∫ aˆ
a˜
uy
1
a¯− ada+ +
∫ a˜
a
uz
1
a¯− ada. (29)
6In Japan, the replacement rate of pension benefits is chosen to maintain fifty percent in the future at 2004
pension reform.
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Type x are households that have the ability [aˆ, a¯]; type y are households that have the ability
[a˜, aˆ]. Also, type z are households that have the ability [a, a˜].
Substituting (4)–(7) and (16) into (29), we obtain the following social welfare function of
W =
∫ a¯
a˜
ln
(
(1− τ)aw − T + S
1 + r
)
1
a¯− ada+
∫ a˜
a
ln
(
(1− τ)a˜w − T + S
1 + r
)
1
a¯− ada
− (1− α− β)
∫ aˆ
a˜
ln a
1
a¯− ada
− (1− α− β)
∫ a˜
a
ln a˜
1
a¯− ada− (1− α− β)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ln(1− ) 1
a¯− ada
− (1− α− β)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ln p
1
a¯− a − (1− α− β)
∫ aˆ
a
lnφ(1− τ)w 1
a¯− ada
+
∫ a¯
a
C
a¯− ada, (30)
where C ≡ α lnα + β lnβ + (1 − α − β) ln(1 − α − β) + β ln(1 + r). Differentiating (30) by T ,
we obtain dWdT as follows.
dW
dT
=
1
(1− τ)(a¯− a)
(
ln
(1− τ)a¯w + S1+r
(1− τ)a˜w + S1+r
(
−1 + 1
1 + r
dS
dT
)
− (1− τ)w ln
(
(1− τ)a˜w + S
1 + r
)
da˜
dT
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W1
+
a˜− a
a¯− a
−1 + 11+r dSdT
(1− τ)a˜w + S1+r
+
(1− τ)a˜w + S1+r
a¯− a
da˜
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
W2
− (1− α− β) ln aˆ
daˆ
dT − ln a˜ da˜dT
a¯− a︸ ︷︷ ︸
W3
− (1− α− β)
a˜−a
a˜ + ln a˜
a¯− a
da˜
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
W4
+ (1− α− β)(a¯− aˆ)
a¯− a
d
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
W5
− 1− α− β
a¯− a
(
− daˆ
dT
ln p+
a¯− aˆ
p
dp
dT
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
W6
− 1− α− β
a¯− a lnφ(1− τ)w
daˆ
dT︸ ︷︷ ︸
W7
. (31)
It remains ambiguous whether the subsidy for elderly care services can raise the social welfare
or not. W1 and W2 show that the subsidy affects the household income. W3 shows that the
subsidy increases social welfare because the aggregate opportunity cost decreases thanks to an
increase in the subsidy to use more elderly care services. W4 shows that the subsidy decreases
social welfare because the opportunity cost to the individuals working in elderly care services
increases because of an increase in wage rates in elderly care service. W5 and W6 show that the
subsidy can raise social welfare because of subsidy incentives to use elderly care services. W7
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shows that the subsidy can raise social welfare because individuals who use elderly care services
increase and the aggregate opportunity cost decreases.
Therefore, it is apparent that the subsidy for elderly care service affects social welfare in many
ways. The subsidy reduces the consumer’s price of elderly care and increases social welfare, as
shown by W5 + W6. Social welfare increases as shown by W1 if the tax burden is smaller than
the increase in pension benefit. However, one must consider that individuals can use elderly
care services by virtue of the subsidy and social welfare increases. Then, even if the household’s
income decreases because of the tax burden and the small increase in pension benefits, social
welfare can increase by virtue of an increase in the individuals who use elderly care services.
The subsidy raises the wage rate of elderly care services and this increases the opportunity cost
to care for their parents by their time. We note that social welfare decreases if this effect is
large.
6 Conclusions
This paper presents an examination of how the government can increase pension benefits in a
pay-as-you-go pension. The results derived in this paper are the following. An increase in the
pension contribution rate can not always increase pension benefits because an increase in the
contribution rate decreases the opportunity cost of providing elderly care services with time and
decreases the labor supply, which decreases the revenue for pension benefits. However, if the
government provides a subsidy for elderly care service in the market, then the younger people
stop elderly care with their time and purchase elderly care services and increase the labor supply.
As a result, the revenue for pension benefits increases.
This paper shows how social security benefits should be spent. Generally, the government
levies on the labor income of younger people to provide pension benefits for older people in
economically developed countries such as Japan. As long as this pension system is adopted, an
increase in labor supply can keep the pension benefit level shown by the replacement rate of
pension. Although an increase in fertility with child care policies is regarded as maintaining the
pension benefit, the policy by which younger people increase to buy elderly care services in the
12
market and increase their labor supply can be adopted to maintain the pension benefits even if
fertility, which indicates the working population size in future, remains at a low level.
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Appendix
Proof of da˜
d
> 0
The demand for elderly care service in the market Et is shown as
Et =
∫ a¯
aˆ
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)aw − T + St+11+r
)
(1− )pt
1
a¯− ada. (32)
Given a constant price of elderly care service pt, we examine that an increase in the subsidy for
elderly care  at  = 0 raises the demand for elderly care services.
dEt
d
=
1− α− β
(a¯− a)pt
(
(1− τ)w(a¯2 − aˆ2)
2
+
(a¯− aˆ)St+1
1 + r
)(
1− (a¯− aˆ)(1− α− β)
a¯− a
)
−
(1− α− β)
(
(1− τ)aˆw + St+11+r
)
pt(a¯− a)
daˆ
d
+
a¯− aˆ
pt(a¯− a)(1 + r)
dS
d
. (33)
The first term and second term have a positive sign. However, the sign of dSd is not determined
here. Therefore, if dSd < 0 and this effect is large,
dEt
d can be negative. However, we consider
the case in which the subsidy for elderly care service raises aggregate demand for care services,
i.e., dEtd > 0. Then, as shown in Fig. the quantity of purchasing elderly care service increases.
Therefore, labor input for elderly care service increases, i.e., we obtain da˜d > 0.
[Insert Fig around here.]
Condition of Local Stability
This appendix derives the condition of local stability at T = 0 and  = 0. Completely differen-
tiating (22) by St, St+1 and a˜, one obtains
nτ
a¯− a
((
(α+ β)(3a˜+ a)w − 1− α− β
1− τ
S
1 + r
1
ρφ(1− τ)
)
da˜− 1− α− β
1− τ
aˆ− a
1 + r
dSt+1
)
= dSt.
(34)
Completely differentiating (21) by St+1 and a˜, one obtains
da˜ =
(1−α−β)(a¯−aˆ)
1+r
(2a˜− a)w + 1−α−βρφ(1−τ)
(
(1− τ)a˜w + S1+r
)dSt+1. (35)
Substituting (35) into (34), dSt+1dst is obtained as
dSt+1
dSt
=
1
nτ
a¯−a
(
(1−α−β)(a¯−aˆ)
1+r
(
(α+β)(3a˜+a)− 1−α−β
1−τ
S
1+r
1
ρφ(1−τ)
)
(2a˜−a)w+ 1−α−β
ρφ(1−τ)((1−τ)a˜w+ S1+r )
− 1−α−β1−τ aˆ−a1+r
) . (36)
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With −1 < dSt+1dSt < 1, the steady state is locally stable.
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Et, Xt
pt
Aggregate Supply Xt
Aggregate Demand Et
Fig.: Subsidy for Elderly Care Service and Aggregate Demand.
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